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Manufacturing has played an important role in helping the United States achieve more inclusive income growth. Economic growth depends ultimately on improvements in productivity, and output per worker in manufacturing has historically grown more rapidly than output per worker in the rest of the economy. This has meant that manufacturing has made a disproportionate contribution to income growth. 1 In addition, manufacturing helped make growth more inclusive because it has provided opportunities for men without a college degree to earn relatively high wages and enter the middle class. In 1970, for example, CPS data indicate that fully 35.6 percent of men without a college degree who held a full-time job worked in US manufacturing, and even in 2015, 17.4 percent of men without a college degree were employed full-time worked in manufacturing. 2 We like to believe that good things come together, but unfortunately, when it comes to manufacturing, there appears to be a tradeoff between employment and productivity growth.
Many see globalization as the most important reason for the erosion in US manufacturing
employment, but I will show that for many decades relatively faster productivity growth interacting with unresponsive demand for goods has actually been the dominant force behind the declining share of employment in manufacturing in the United States and other industrial economies. Since 2010, however, the relationship has been reversed and much slower productivity growth in manufacturing has been associated with more robust performance in manufacturing employment and nominal spending on goods.
Price changes tend to reflect total factor productivity changes (Nordhaus 2005) . Faster productivity growth in manufacturing will therefore generally lead to lower relative prices for manufactured goods. Figure 1 plots the ratio of (total factor) productivity growth in manufacturing to total factor productivity growth in GDP (TFPMAN/TFPGDP) from 1970 to 2010. It also plots the ratio of the prices for GDP to prices for gross manufacturing value-added (PGDP/PMAN). When (PGDP/PMAN) increases it means that manufacturing goods are becoming relatively cheap, and the figure shows vividly the close association between relative In principle, the tradeoff between employment and productivity growth is not inevitable.
Faster productivity growth means that fewer workers (and other inputs) are needed to produce a given volume of output, but if the quantity demanded is very responsive to lower prices, the volume of goods sold could so increase that more rather than fewer workers would ultimately be employed. While there may be some manufacturing products for which demand is responsive to relative price, for the manufacturing sector as a whole this is not the case. Thus relatively faster productivity growth in manufacturing has led to smaller shares of spending on goods.
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In addition, economic growth due to faster productivity raises incomes. Whether this income growth increases employment in goods production depends on how people spend their income gains. As they become richer, people could in theory devote increasing or decreasing shares of their spending to goods. But in practice, as incomes rise, the share spent on goods declines (Boppart 2014) . Poor people spend more of their money on goods. They tend to buy more food, clothing, and motorcycles. 5 Rich people, by contrast, spend more of their money on services. They eat in restaurants, have personal trainers, hire accountants and lawyers, and see psychiatrists. Taken together, therefore, faster productivity growth in the production of goods and more rapid income growth both reduce the share of spending on goods and thus the share of workers required to produce them.
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Figure 2 provides estimates of ratios of relative prices, quantities, and values of US final spending on goods versus services and structures. 7 The data are for final spending on goods and 5 thus reflect not only the value-added in manufacturing but also the value-added in the raw materials used to produce the goods and the additional costs required to distribute them to final consumers. Thus they only reflect the demand for manufacturing value-added under the assumption that the margins for inputs and distribution remain constant. Nonetheless, they are revealing.
The data are expressed in logarithms and can thus be interpreted as percentages. The top line shows the decline in the prices of goods relative to services over the 69-year period-by 136 log points or just less than 2 percent per year. By contrast the bottom line shows the increase in quantities of goods purchased relative to services-by 66 log points or just less than 1 percent per year. The result is that the value of spending on goods has fallen relative to the value of spending on services and structures by roughly 1 percent annually (the middle line). The figure shows that Americans have responded to declining relative prices of goods and higher incomes by spending more of their money on services.
The decline in relative prices of goods and the rise in incomes do not boost demand for goods enough to offset the decline in the demand for labor and other inputs due to relatively faster productivity growth in the production of goods. Moreover, the rate at which the US manufacturing employment share has fallen over the past three decades as the economy globalized further-about 0.4 percentage points per year-is remarkably similar to the rate at which it fell in the 1960s and 1970s. This similarity suggests that the forces that operated in the early years continue to dominate. As shown in figure we estimate that because of rapid productivity growth in manufacturing, the manufacturing employment content of the US trade deficit in 2010 (2.7 million jobs) was actually lower than that estimated for 2000 (3.3 million jobs). In other words, rapid productivity growth in manufacturing implies that over time any given trade deficit translates into fewer jobs.
11 Manufacturing employment performance was unusual after 2000 however because in addition to a declining share, absolute employment also fell. However, as shown in Lawrence and Edwards (2013; pp3-4) this decline was predictable given the historic relationship between changes in manufacturing employment and changes in total employment. Nager (2017) has objected to the fitting of a linear rather an exponential trend on the grounds that a linear curve implies eventually manufacturing employment would disappear. However, the linear trend has a much better R-squared fit than the exponential trend and as noted the specification using percentage changes in manufacturing and in the rest of the economy also fits the data out of sample between 2000 and 2010 almost perfectly. 12 "Applying this direct plus full input-output measure of exposure increases our estimates of trade-induced job losses for 1999-2011 to 985,000 workers in manufacturing alone and to 1.98 million workers in the entire economy" (Acemoglu et al. 2016, S145) . A very similar job loss estimate of 0.8 million manufacturing jobs is obtained by Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Paro (2017, abstract) . Hicks and Devaraj (2017, 6) estimate that that between 2000 and 2010, 13.4 percent of manufacturing jobs (750,000) lost were due to trade.
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RECENT US EXPERIENCE
As can be seen in figure 3 , since about 2010, the long-run trend line no longer fits the data. 15 Moreover, according to the more comprehensive measure of productivity growth- 13 Since value-added per full-time equivalent employed in manufacturing has increased from $162,993 to $180,577 per worker over the same period, the employment equivalence of the manufacturing trade deficit has increased by a million, up from 2.5 million to 3.5 million jobs. 14 For a discussion of the pitfalls of assuming trade deficits necessarily lead to employment loss, see Edwards and Lawrence (2013, 33-42) . 15 The computer industry was a major driver of manufacturing productivity, and as emphasized by Baily and Bosworth (2014) , a major part of that industry has moved abroad, inevitably reducing average output and multifactor productivity growth ( In sum, in recent years we have seen (1) slower declines in the share of manufacturing employment; (2) slower productivity growth in manufacturing; (c) higher relative prices for manufacturing value-added rather than lower prices; and (d) relative prices for goods at the consumer level falling more slowly. In response, spending on goods compared with services is also falling much less rapidly than before. These outcomes are all predictable if there is a relative slowdown in productivity growth in manufacturing and demand for goods is price inelastic.
productivity growth, both because measuring productivity growth in computers is difficult and because its share in output is declining. 16 shows that an increased trade surplus in manufactured goods can lead to an increase in the level of manufacturing employment-Germany, Italy, and Japan, for example, clearly have higher shares of manufacturing employment than the other countries-but as productivity growth increases over time, the employment content of a given surplus (or deficit) will decline and eventually the long-run trends that reflect the interaction between productivity growth and demand will tend to dominate the outcomes.
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
It is also noteworthy that the United States is not unique in having had a slower decline in 
WHAT ARE THEY DOING WITH THE ROBOTS?
The changed spending responses can also help shed light on another controversy that relates to productivity growth (Feldstein 2017; Fernald 2012; Baily, Manyika, and Gupta 2013; Branstetter and Sichel 2017) . On the one hand, many productivity experts claim we are living in period of very slow productivity growth. Robert Gordon (2012), a leading techno-pessimist, has vividly described how the information technology revolution that stimulated productivity growth between 1995 and 2005 has run its course and that our ability to sustain strong economic growth has run into significant headwinds. Tyler Cowen (2011) agrees that we have already picked the low-hanging fruit that can improve living standards. These views are consistent with data and the consensus of professional forecasters. For example, as noted by Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2017, 24) , a survey of professional forecasters shows that while in 2007 they had projected that the United States would achieve long-run growth in labor productivity of 2.3 percent, by 2012-13, their projections had declined to an average of 1.9 percent.
On the other hand are claims that we are going through a new era in which the pace of change is so rapid that it deserves a new name such as "the fourth industrial revolution" (Schwab 2016) or "the second machine age" (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) . These techno-optimists see a world that is awash in new technologies that will bring about fundamental economic and social changes. They point to improvements in information processing that are revolutionizing areas such as artificial intelligence, big-data analytics, precision medicine, machine learning, robotics, 3-D printing, cloud computing, the internet of things, and autonomous vehicles that are capable of unleashing a surge in productivity and accelerate economic growth. 18 Indeed, many now view the luddites more favorably and are concerned that the ability to digitize technology will displace both skilled and unskilled workers and make it increasingly difficult to earn a living wage. This has prompted proposals to deal with these prospective inequities either by having the workers own the machines (Freeman 2016) or by slowing their progress through the taxation of capital (Piketty 2013 ).
The productivity facts, thus far, are on the side of the techno-pessimists, but some technooptimists claim that the official data understate the quality of recent innovations and the 18 For additional discussion of emerging technologies in manufacturing, see Baily and Bosworth (2014, 19-22) .
improvements they have enabled. But it has always been difficult to measure productivity growth, especially when it involves radically new products and technologies, so that to make the case for mismeasurement, it is necessary to claim not simply that there is mismeasurement but also that mismeasurement has become increasingly worse.
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One response to mismeasurement is developing better methodologies for measuring prices. 20 But another is to examine the data on spending. Ultimately the buyers are the best judges of quality. Buyers will respond to true prices rather than nominal prices. If true prices are actually lower than official prices, and demand is inelastic, nominal spending should fall in response to productivity improvements. Many advances such as robotics, 3-D printing, the internet of things, big data, and the cloud should be improving productivity in the production and distribution of goods. If, in reality, these have accelerated the relative productivity growth in goods production, the share of nominal spending on goods should fall even faster than before.
The share of total US nominal spending on goods (C + I + G) declined from 36. suggests that the recent relative slowdown in manufacturing productivity is real.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
Manufacturing has played a special role in economic growth and it is not surprising that many governments currently have major initiatives that aim at promoting advanced manufacturing technology. Ultimately economic progress rests upon technological innovation, and if they prove 19 Feldstein (2017, 153-56) emphasizes the problems that result from understating productivity growth when new goods or services are introduced. This could mean that productivity growth will be measured as slowing down especially during innovative periods when more new products are being introduced. 20 Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2017) argue that the official producer price index has understated recent improvements in information technology and develop new hedonic price measures that take account of improvements in the performance of a given set of tasks valued by users based on tests undertaken by the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation. Between 2009 and 2013, for example, while the producer price index for microprocessors declined annually by just 6 percent, the authors estimate annual declines (i.e., improvements in performance) of 42 percent using their measures based on performance. Byrne and Corrado (2017) estimate that between 2004 and 2014 similar improvements took place in computer servers and storage (26.1 percent annual price declines), PCs (23.7 percent annual price declines), and data networking (12.1 percent annual price declines).
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successful these initiatives could provide a much needed boost to economic growth. But these initiatives are also often motivated by the claim that they will increase blue collar employment and the evidence in this paper suggests a painful tradeoff. Faster productivity growth generated by advanced manufacturing technology may lead to more rapid growth, but it is unlikely to be inclusive. 
